One model, advocated by Descartes as well as by many contemporary psychologists, posits a few basic emotions out of which all others are compounded. An alternative model views every emotion as consisting in, or at least including, some irreducibly specific component not compounded of anything simpler. Again, emotions might form an indefinitely broad continuum comprising a small number of finite dimensions e. In much the way that color arises from the visual system's comparison of retinal cones, whose limited sensitivity ranges correspond roughly to primary hues, we might then hope to find relatively simple biological explanations for the rich variety of emotions.
Rigid boundaries between them would be arbitrary. Alternative models, based in physiology or evolutionary psychology, have posited modular subsystems or agents the function of which is to coordinate the fulfilment of basic needs, such as mating, affiliation, defense and the avoidance of predators. Panksepp , Cosmides and Tooby An eclectic approach therefore seems warranted. What does seem well established in the light of cross-cultural research is that a small number of emotions have inter-translatable names and universally recognizable expressions.
According to Ekman and Friesen these are happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust the last two of which, however, some researchers consider too simple to be called emotions Panksepp Other emotions are not so easily recognizable cross-culturally, and some expressions are almost as local as dialects.
But then this is an issue on which cognitive science alone should not, perhaps, be accorded the last word: Some treat emotion as one of many separate faculties. For Plato in the Republic, there seems to have been three basic components of the human mind: Hume's notorious dictum that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions also placed the emotions at the very center of character and agency.
For Spinoza, emotions are not lodged in a separate body in conflict with the soul, since soul and body are aspects of a single reality; but emotions, as affections of the soul, make the difference between the best and the worst lives, as they either increase the soul's power to act, or diminish that power.
In other models, emotions as a category are apt to be sucked into either of two other faculties of mind.
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They are then treated as mere composites or offshoots of those other faculties: The Stoics made emotions into judgments about the value of things incidental to an agent's virtue, to which we should therefore remain perfectly indifferent. Kant too saw emotions as essentially conative phenomena, but grouped them with inclinations enticing the will to act on motives other than that of duty. Bedford stressed both the intentionality and the importance of contextual factors on the nature, arousal and expression of emotions.
Kenny, reviving some medieval theories of intentionality, urged that emotions should be viewed as intentional states. He defined a notion of a formal object of an intentional state as that characteristic that must belong to something if it is to be possible for the state to relate to it. This implies an excessively strong logical link between the state and its object's actual possession of the characteristic in question. Nevertheless it points to an important condition on the appropriateness of an emotion to a given object see Section 3 below.
These papers gave impetus to what became the cognitivist mainstream in philosophy of emotion, some fairly wide variations going from C. Among other philosophers responsible for the revival of interest in emotions, Irving Thalberg took as given the cognitive dimension of emotion, and explored some of the subtleties of the different relations of emotions to their objects. On this view, favored later by some feminist philosophers such as Naomi Scheman and Sue Campbell , emotions are not primarily viewed as individual characteristics of the persons to whom they are attributed, but emerge out of the dynamics of social interaction.
Economic models of rational decision and agency inspired by Bayesian theory are essentially assimilative models, viewing emotion either as a species of belief, or as a species of desire. Emotion is ready to pick up the slack. Recent work, often drawing support from the burgeoning study of the emotional brain, has recognised that while emotions typically involve both cognitive and conative states, they are distinct from both, if only in being significantly more complex.
Emotions vary so much in a number of dimensions—transparency, intensity, behavioral expression, object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment—as to cast doubt on the assumption that they have anything in common. However, while this variation may have led philosophers to steer clear of emotions in the past, many philosophers are now rising to the challenge.
The explanatory inadequacy of theories that shortchange emotion is becoming increasingly apparent, and, as Peter Goldie observes, it is no longer the case that emotion is treated as a poor relation in the philosophy of mind. Lange according to which emotions are specifically feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions.
When we perceive that we are in danger, for example, this perception sets off a collection of bodily responses, and our awareness of these responses is what constitutes fear.
This objection was first voiced by Walter Cannon According to James, what distinguishes emotions is the fact that each involves the perception of a unique set of bodily changes. Cannon claimed, however, that the visceral reactions characteristic of distinct emotions such as fear and anger are identical, and so these reactions cannot be what allow us to tell emotions apart.
Subjects in their study were injected with epinephrine, a stimulant of the sympathetic system. Schacter and Singer found that these subjects tended to interpret the arousal they experienced either as anger or as euphoria, depending on the type of situation they found themselves in. Some were placed in a room where an actor was behaving angrily; others were placed in a room where an actor was acting silly and euphoric. In both cases the subjects' mood tended to follow that of the actor.
The conclusion most frequently drawn is that, although some forms of general arousal are easily labeled in terms of some emotional state, there is no hope of finding in physiological states any principle of distinction between specific emotions.
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The differentiae of specific emotions are not physiological, but cognitive or something else. However, brain or bodily changes and the feelings accompanying these changes get us only part way towards an adequate taxonomy. To account for the differences between guilt, embarrassment, and shame, for example, a plausible theory will have to look beyond physiology and common-sense phenomenology.
Emotions, however, are capable of being not only explained, but also justified—they are closely related to the reasons that give rise to them. If someone angers me, I can cite my antagonist's deprecatory tone; if someone makes me jealous, I can point to his poaching on my emotional property. Feeling theories, by assimilating emotions to sensations, fail to take account of the fact that emotions are typically directed at intentional objects.
Peter Goldie is among those who have recently advocated a return to the close identification of emotions with feelings, on the ground that the divorce between them was decreed on false premises: Some emotional feelings are simply bodily feelings and thus, whilst intentional, do not have this kind of intentionality Goldie Only if we understand the crucial component of feeling in emotion are we likely to understand the large nugget of truth in the traditional view of emotions as often irrational and disruptive.
Furthermore, Goldie holds that certain primitive emotions, on the analogy of cognitively impenetrable perceptual illusions, influence action tendencies without the mediation of propositions or concepts Goldie If someone insults me and I become angry, his impertinence will be the aspect of his behavior that fits the formal object of anger: I only become angry once I construe the person's remark as a slight; the specific nature of my emotion's formal object is a function of my appraisal of the situation.
Magna Arnold introduced the notion of appraisal into psychology, characterizing it as the process through which the significance of a situation for an individual is determined. Subsequent appraisal theories accept the broad features of Arnold's account, and differ mainly in emphasis. Richard Lazarus makes the strong claim that appraisals are both necessary and sufficient for emotion, and sees the identity of particular emotions as being completely determined by the patterns of appraisal giving rise to them.
Nico Frijda takes the patterns of action readiness following appraisals to be what characterize different emotions, but departs from Arnold in not characterizing these patterns solely in terms of attraction and aversion. Klaus Scherer and his Geneva school have elaborated appraisal theories into sophisticated models that anatomize different emotions in terms of some eighteen or more dimensions of appraisal. Emotions turn out to be reliably correlated, if not identified, with patterns of such complex appraisals. Appraisal theories can be described as taking a functional approach to emotion, insofar as appraisals lead to reactions whose function is to deal with specific situation types having some significance for an individual Scherer This approach suggests that the space of emotions can be conceptualized as multidimensional.
In practice, however, so-called dimensional theories simplify the problem of representation by reducing these to just two or three Russell Emotional valence, like value in general, can be assessed in several overlapping dimensions of appraisal: This question is often given an evolutionary answer: Emotional expressions, he thought, once served particular functions e.
Much research has been done on this group of emotions usually listed as happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust and scientifically- minded philosophers often restrict their discussions of emotion to the affect programs, since these are those best understood of all emotional phenomena Griffiths ; DeLancey ; Prinz However, the affect program model leaves out a good deal. In particular, it ignores those emotions which involve higher cognitive processes, such as jealousy, envy, and Schadenfreude. It is these sorts of emotions which many philosophers have made the focus of their own theories of emotion.
The research program of evolutionary psychology Cosmides et al. In any case, the mechanisms elaborated by natural selection in the context of competitive survival, dominance, mating and affiliation are not necessarily harmonious. This has led many philosophers to stress cognitive aspects of emotions. But there are several different ways of understanding the cognitions involved. While appraisal theorists generally allow that the cognitive processes underlying emotion can be either conscious or unconscious, and can involve either propositional or non-propositional content, cognitivists typically claim that emotions involve propositional attitudes.
Many emotions are specified in terms of propositions: Some proponents of cognitivism universalize this feature, and maintain that any emotion must involve some sort of attitude directed at a proposition. My anger at someone simply is the judgment that I have been wronged by that person. Emotions have been described as sets of beliefs and desires Marks , affect-laden judgments Broad ; Lyons , and as complexes of beliefs, desires, and feelings Oakley John Deigh has objected that the view of emotions as propositional attitudes has the effect of excluding animals and infants lacking language.
Others have argued that if emotions always involve the standard propositional attitudes, namely belief and desire, then an account of the rationality of emotions will collapse into an account of what it is for those standard propositional attitudes to be rational: Another criticism, stressed by Wollheim draws upon a difference between transient mental states and mental dispositions.
Emotions, like beliefs and desires, can exist either as occurrent events jealousy of a rival at a party or as persisting modifications of the mind a tendency to feel jealousy. However, dispositional beliefs have a straightforward connection with their occurrent manifestations: Sincere avowal of desires also counts as evidence for underlying dispositions, though the connection is not as tight. Dispositional emotions, on the other hand, do not have tailor-made forms of expression, but can be manifested in a whole diverse range of behavior.
In some cases, what might be held to be dispositional emotions are not necessarily dispositions to undergo a specific occurrent emotion of the same name. Love, for example, while it can be manifested in amorous feelings, is sometimes expressed in any of a practically unlimited variety of occurrent emotions — including longing, grief, jealousy, rage, and other less than pleasant occurrent feelings.
I may feel a twinge of suspicion towards my butler, and yet believe him to be utterly trustworthy; conversely, I may judge that he is up to no good, and yet feel nothing in the way of emotion. These examples suggest an analogy with perceptual illusions, which a correct belief sometimes quite fails to dispel. It remains that even if perceptions necessarily have propositional content, they cannot be assimilated to belief: Furthermore, it is not obvious that the content of perceptions or emotions are exhausted by their propositional content Peacocke Goldie ; Wollheim ; Charland ; Tappolet We will or desire what does not yet exist, and deem ourselves successful if the world is brought into line with the mind's plan.
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To take this approach is to give a particular answer to a question posed long ago in Plato's Euthyphro the question, as originally put forward, concerned the nature of piety, but it extends to values in general: Do we love X—mutatis mutandis for the other emotions—because X is lovable, or do we declare X to be lovable merely because we love it? The first alternative is the objectivist one, encouraged by the analogy of perception.
Specifically it promises a valid analogy between some of the ways in which we can speak of perception as aspiring to objectivity and ways in which we can say the same of emotion. In terms of the analogy of perception, to say that emotions are universally subjective in this sense would be to claim that they resemble hallucinations more than veridical perceptions.
The perceptual system is capable of the sort of functioning-in-a-vacuum that leads to perceptual mistakes. On the other hand, the lack of perceptual capacities can be a crippling handicap in one's attempt to negotiate the world: This explains why we are so often tempted to take seriously ascription of reasonableness or unreasonableness, fittingness or inappropriateness, for common emotions. Unfortunately it is unclear how the alleged objective properties identified by emotions might be identified independently.
Passivity has an ambiguous relation to subjectivity. In another vein, however, it has been noted that the passivity of emotions is sometimes precisely analogous to the passivity of perception. How the world is, is not in our power. So it is only to be expected that our emotions, if they actually represent something genuinely and objectively in the world, should not be in our power either: But there is yet another way of establishing this connection, compatible with the perceptual model. This is to draw attention to the role of emotions as providing the framework for cognitions of the more conventional kind.
Emotions make certain features of situations or arguments more prominent, giving them a weight in our experience that they would have lacked in the absence of emotion. Consider how Iago proceeds to make Othello jealous. He directs Othello's attention, suggests questions to ask, and insinuates that there are inferences to be drawn without specifying them himself. Once Othello's attention turns to his wife's friendship with Cassio and the lost handkerchief, inferences which on the same evidence would not even have been thought of before are now experienced as compelling: Emotions set the agenda for beliefs and desires: As every committee chairperson knows, questions have much to do with the determination of answers: Much the same reasons motivate their assimilation to desire.
A particularly subtle examination of the role of narrative in constituting our emotions over the long term is to be found in Goldie It seems conceptually incoherent to suppose that one could have an emotion—say, an intense jealousy or a consuming rage—for only a fraction of a second Wollheim One explanation of this feature of emotions is that a story plays itself out during the course of each emotional episode, and stories take place over stretches of time.
Later still, they are supplemented and refined by literature and other art forms capable of expanding the range of one's imagination of ways to live. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: Once our emotional repertoire is established, we interpret various situations we are faced with through the lens of different paradigm scenarios.
When a particular scenario suggests itself as an interpretation, it arranges or rearranges our perceptual, cognitive, and inferential dispositions. It is not clear whether this places unreasonable limitations on the range of possible criticism to which emotions give rise. What is certain is that when a paradigm scenario is evoked by a novel situation, the resulting emotion may or may not be appropriate to the situation that triggers it. In that sense at least, then, emotions can be assessed for rationality.
What do they ultimately consist in? They might be physiological processes, or perceptions of physiological processes, or neuro-psychological states, or adaptive dispositions, or evaluative judgments, or computational states, or even social facts or dynamical processes. In fact most philosophers would assent to most of these descriptions while regarding all as partial.
In view of the acknowledged complexity of emotional functions, it seems wise to rephrase the question not in terms of ontology, but in terms of levels of explanation. The trichotomy first introduced by David Marr remains an excellent starting point. At the computational level which most would now call the functional level , we need to identify the emotions' basic teleology: This will be appropriate even if one believes, as some traditionally have, that emotions actually represent the breakdown of smoothly adaptive functions such as thought, perception, and rational planning.
For in that case the emotions will be understood precisely in terms of their failure to promote the smooth working of the cognitive and conative functions. Such a failure will trigger a descent to a lower level of explanation, adverting to the counterproductive exercise of mechanisms at the algorithmic and implementational levels.
The second designates the actual neuro-physiological processes whereby, in animals built on a specific plan such as mammals or humans such as we, these sub-functions are normally carried out. It is generally agreed that the simpler emotions, those whose expression and recognition Ekman , has shown to be universal, are driven by the basic needs of organisms such as mating, defense or avoidance of predators, and social affiliation. All complex mammals require swift, relatively stereotyped responses to these challenges.
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Each affect program comprises a coordinated syndrome of responses which we attribute to the algorithmic level implemented at the physiological hormonal and neurological , muscular-skeletal, and expressive levels in ways that owe their uniformity to homology, that is to say their common ancestral origin. Other emotions, however, bear only relations of analogy with these and don't count as natural kinds either singly or as a class. Relying on Panksepp , , Charland argues that the integrated mechanism of seven basic emotions Panksepp's list differs slightly from Ekman's are implemented by distinct circuits forming natural kinds not only in the human but more widely in the mammalian brain.
Emoters form a distinct kind in view of their ancestral organization in terms of certain basic functions, the specific algorithms that contribute to those functions, and their implementation in terms of physiological, expressive, hormonal, and motivational processes. This is sufficient not only to justify treating the specific emotions as natural kinds, but to treat emotion in general as a natural kind Charland , This view seems to require that we regard emotions as a set of processes distinguished at all three levels of explanation.
Emotions in general should then be viewed as a genus of processes typically involving five different component aspects or components, comprising subjective feeling, cognition, motor expression, action tendencies or desire, and neurological processes Scherer On this view, individual emotions would owe their specific identity to all five components: The dominant metaphor in Freud's early work was hydraulic.
What does this observation lead us to expect for emotions? But at more proximate levels, three dominant contemporary models might be expected to lay claims on emotion theory: But no philosopher, for fear perhaps of defining themselves out of relevant competence, has been willing to concede that emotions just are physiological processes. Instead they are held to be complexes in which physiology plays a part at the level of implementation of some higher-level process. The higher-level process in which an emotion consists owes its overall structure to functional needs, and typically comprises, in addition to physiological aspects, behavioural, expressive, and phenomenological, components.
They were broached early by a couple of psychoanalysts turned hackers Peterfreund , Shank and Colby and played an important role in the theoretical elaborations of John Bowlby's work on the mechanisms and psychological consequences of early separation and loss. These works attempted to model Freudian concepts of the dynamics of conscious and unconscious mental life in computational terms. The key idea was to set up second-order parameters that acted on the first-order modules of perception, belief and desire, thus regulating or disrupting the operation of perceptual and action programs.
From the sidelines, de Sousa suggested that connectionist systems or analog models stand a better chance of modeling emotion than those based on classical von Neuman-type digital computation, but that suggestion hasn't gone anywhere. From the point of view of computational theory, the prevailing wind, backed by both evolutionary speculation and neurological findings on control systems and relatively independent affect- programs, has tended to favour modular conceptions of emotion rather than holistic ones.
Charland , Robinson Aaron Sloman has elaborated the sort of ideas that were embryonic in Shank and Colby into a more sophisticated computational theory of the mind in which emotions are virtual machines, playing a crucial role in a complex hierarchic architecture in which they control, monitor, schedule and sometimes disrupt other control modules.
Wright, Sloman and Beaudoin The notion of architecture here adverts to the complex hierarchy of control of component modular mechanisms. It explicitly eschews hypotheses about implementation. Joining the growing consensus that emotion phenomena reflect distinct, successively evolved behavioral control systems, Sloman distinguishes between a primitive or primary stream rooted in relatively fixed neuro-physiological response syndromes, a more elaborate control system bringing in cortical control, as well as a third level, probably exclusive to humans, which most closely corresponds to the layer of emotions that we are most concerned with when we think of the emotional charge of art and literature or of the complexity of social intercourse.
Rosalind Picard lays out the evidence for the view that computers will need emotions to be truly intelligent, and in particular to interact intelligently with humans. She also adverts to the role of emotions in evaluation and the pruning of search spaces. But she is as much concerned to provide an emotional theory of computation as to elaborate a computational theory of emotions. Marvin Minsky explores the many-faceted nature of mental life, including emotions, from a computer modeling point of view. Paul Thagard ; has elaborated computer models in which emotional valence interacts with evidential strength to determine a mode of emotional coherence.
One remarkable attempt to integrate the perspective of dynamical systems into understanding of emotional life is that of Magai and Haviland-Jones , who draw on dynamical systems theory to model the elusive combination of unpredictability and patterned coherence found in the life-long evolution of individuality.
Like predecessors such as Bowlby — , they are motivated by a goal of understanding at the level of conscious experience as well as of underlying mechanisms: It is therefore particularly pertinent to the preoccupations of those who are interested in the normative dimensions of emotions: I address these questions in the next three sections. But these notions are mainly critical ones. For the number of goals that it is logically possible to posit at any particular time is virtually infinite, and the number of possible strategies that might be employed in pursuit of them is orders of magnitude larger.
Moreover, in considering possible strategies, the number of consequences of any one strategy is again infinite, so that unless some drastic pre-selection can be effected among the alternatives their evaluation could never be completed. Descartes said it thus: In fact, few kinds of self-knowledge could matter more than knowing one's own repertoire of emotional responses. At the same time, emotions are both the cause and the subject of many failures of self-knowledge. Their complexity entails much potential to mislead or be misled.
Insofar as most emotions involve belief, they inherit the susceptibility of the latter to self-deception. Recent literature on self-deception has striven to dissolve the air of paradox to which this once gave rise Fingarette , Mele But there remain three distinct sources of self-deception that stem from features of emotions already alluded to. There was something right in James's claim that the emotion follows on, rather than causing the voluntary and involuntary bodily changes which are held to express it. Because some of these changes are either directly or indirectly subject to our choices, we are able to pretend or dissimulate emotion.
That implies that we can sometimes be caught in our own pretense. Sometimes we identify our emotions by what we feel: Poets have always known that the main effect of love is to redirect attention: When my love turns to anger I still focus on him, but now attend to a very different set of properties. This suggests one way of controlling or dominating my emotion: But this carries a risk. It is easier to think of something than to avoid thinking about it; and to many cases of emotional distress only the latter could bring adequate relief. This familiar observation alerts us to the role of the unconscious: Where the unconscious is, self-deception necessarily threatens.
This possibility arises in two stages from the admission that there are unconscious motivations for emotions. First, if I am experiencing an emotion that seems altogether inappropriate to its occasion, I will naturally confabulate an explanation for it. A neurotic who is unreasonably angry with his wife because he unconsciously identifies her with his mother will not rest content with having no reason for his anger.
Instead, he will make one up. Second, the reason he makes up will typically be one that is socially approved Averill Many have thought that having certain emotions is an important part of what it is to be a virtuous moral agent. If this is true, then being systematically self-deceived about one's emotions will be a kind of moral failure as well.
Summary of Recent Trends and Ramifications into neighboring disciplines In the past two decades, the philosophy of emotions has become enriched with a number of perspectives that have both embraced and inspired inter-disciplinary studies. In this section, not all references are to works by professional philosophers: Most significantly, the study of emotions has had a considerable impact on ideas about the intersection of morality, politics, psychiatry and law. Emotions are seen by several philosophers as the psychological roots of moral feelings, so that different domains of morality can be traced to groups of emotions of which the prototypes are observed in our primate cousins de Waal ; Joyce Less radically, other philosophers have explored the function of emotion — particularly guilt and shame — in motivating moral behavior Taylor ; Gibbard ; Baier, ; Greenspan In recent years, a notable development in philosophical treatment of emotions has been the attempt to incorporate interdisciplinary approaches and insights into philosophy.
Paul Griffiths , Jessie Prinz , Craig DeLancey , Tim Schroeder are among the most vigorous exponents of the view that philosophical work on the emotions must be re-oriented away from linguistic analysis and more richly rooted in science. Under the impact of explosive progress in brain science, there has been renewed interest in the hypothesis that innate emotional temperament, as well as social environment, condition people's moral and political stance.
Emotional dispositions, in turn, have been linked via neuro-transmitters to specific genes Canli and Lesch At the same time, the influence of social environment and ideology has been studied in increasingly greater depth. More traditional perspectives continue to thrive, notably in the defense, by David Pugmire and others, of a broadly Aristotelian point of view on the moral importance of integrity in emotions. There has also been increasing attention paid to the central role of emotions in psychiatry Blair, Mitchell, and Blair ; Charland , in law and politics Finkel and Parrott ; Deigh , and in religion Roberts A notable development of the past quarter of a century has been the increasing interest in specific emotions.
The role of emotions in our experience of art and literature is an obviously promising area which has received much attention in recent decades. Robert Gordon was one of the first to suggest that the knowledge we have of the states of mind of others, and particularly of their emotional condition, is derived not from any psychological theory, but from an active simulation of that other's state. The idea has been developed by Keith Oatley , as an approach to literature. Fiction, he argues on the basis of much empirical work, works as a simulation run on the wetware of the reader's mind, and has the power to change us.
This view is also supported by Martha Nussbaum, who despite being firmly in the cognitive camp, has insisted that the kind of knowledge involved in moral appraisal is both affective and cognitive. For that reason, the full force of certain moral truths can best be grasped through the medium of literature rather than philosophical argument.
Nussbaum ; ; ; Baier ; Hogan There has been a good deal of work on the role of emotions in music, although there is little consensus about how that works. Emotions in film have also come under scrutiny from philosophers Plantinga ; French, Wettstein and Saint One area that has mushroomed since the last couple of decades of the twentieth Century is the philosophy of sex and love.
At least one book has explored the prospects for love and sex with robots Levy More usually, controversies have centered on the role of reason in generating love, as well as the kinds of reasons for action that love produces or can justify. As might be expected, contemporary contributions to the philosophy of love have on the whole been less sanguine about love, particularly erotic love, than the general run of self-help or popular books in praise of love. Surprisingly, however, the idea that we love for reasons continues to find defenders among philosophers. In debates about the nature of emotions, feminist voices have been important participants, particularly on issues concerning the role of emotions in morality Gilligan ; Larrabee and the question of gender.
On the latter question, as in other aspects of mentality research on gender differences in emotion has generally been dogged by publication bias: Sometimes it has seemed to follow in some mysterious way from the dimorphism of human gametes that men and women must have significantly different experiences of emotions in general and of sex and love in particular.
Nevertheless, a number of thinkers have resisted this trend. Finally, though probably not exhaustively, emotion theorists have turned to collective or shared emotions, as a specific form of shared intentionality; a motivating topic in that area being the question of collective guilt feelings Gilbert ; Tuomela ; Konzelmann Ziv ; Salmela In short, interdisciplinary research has thrived in recent years. Vast projects have sprung up, notably the Centre for Interdisciplinary Study of Affective Sciences CISAS in Geneva, in which philosophers have collaborated with psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental economists, and students of literature to study emotions.
Adequacy Conditions on Philosophical Theories of Emotion Despite the great diversity of views contending in the philosophy of emotions, one can discern a good deal of agreement. A broad consensus has emerged on what we might call adequacy conditions on any theory of emotion. An acceptable philosophical theory of emotions should be able to account at least for the following baker's dozen of characteristics.
All the recent and current accounts of emotion discussed here have something to say about most of them, and some have had something to say about all. Let us know about it. Does this product have an incorrect or missing image? Send us a new image. Is this product missing categories? Checkout Your Cart Price. Topics covered in the handbook cover boys, business, businesspeople, Christianity, cultures, drugs, economics, entertainment, girls, God, gods, homosexuals, the Internet, Islam, Jews, men, news media, obesity, politics, politicians, religions, sex, sexuality, TV commercials, women, and more The contrasts between the animalistic qualities and the god-like qualities of human beings described in the book may suggest to some that the differences may be one of nature's greatest jokes-or that nature is just experimenting as it has done with all other life forms on the planet.
The difference there is that the first group receives a fair wage, while the last is overpaid as a matter of generosity Matt The cistern and well represent his wife. He said that a fox once told a wolf to come with him and he would give him abundant food. It was night, and the fox led the wolf to a well with a bucket at each end of the rope. The fox got into the bucket at the top of the well and rode down to the bottom.
Get in the other bucket and come down right away! It was understood that the outcomes were controlled by God, and the seemingly random procedure eliminated human influence. The last time the ritual is mentioned in the Bible is in the choice of Matthias to replace Judas Acts 1: Many believe that the filling of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost in Acts 2 officially put an end to the ritual because it was then replaced by the direct guidance of the Spirit. As for the second part, they said that if the student had to pay to learn, he should not view this as grounds to charge for teaching others, but should teach the Torah for free.
The message of these verses is the admonition to return good for evil in the hope that your enemy will be moved to repentance. The meaning of the Hebrew is unclear. Other translations propose greyhound. The first vv details the qualities needed to be a wise ruler, and the second vv the qualities describing an excellent wife. Aside from the artistry, the acrostic structure also aided memorization. She is wise because she understands and puts into practice the message contained in 9: Jude 12 Proverbs Amplified Compact Holy Bible, hardcover Retail: Amplified Large-Print Bible, hardcover Retail: Enrich your faith and grow in spiritual maturity with the incredible Bible study and devotional books listed below.
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