"You've changed": sex reassignment and personal identity - Laurie Shrage - Google Книги
Is sex identity a feature of one's mind or body, and is it a relational or intrinsic property? Who is in the best position to know a person's sex, do we each have a true sex, and is a person's sex an alterable characteristic?
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When a person's sex assignment changes, has the old self disappeared and a new one emerged; or, has only the public presentation of one's self change Is sex identity a feature of one's mind or body, and is it a relational or intrinsic property? When a person's sex assignment changes, has the old self disappeared and a new one emerged; or, has only the public presentation of one's self changed?
An interdisciplinary contribution to the emerging field of transgender studies, it will be of interest to students and scholars in a number of disciplines. Paperback , pages. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about You've Changed , please sign up. Lists with This Book. Oct 06, Elevate Difference rated it really liked it. Each essay in Laurie J. Review by Marcie Bianco Alison Davis rated it really liked it May 05, Benjamin Lee Buckley rated it liked it Jul 28, Rachel marked it as to-read Oct 15, Mallory marked it as to-read Oct 16, Jess marked it as to-read Jan 19, Katherine added it Jan 21, Edited by Laurie J.
Kim Atkins - - Hypatia 26 4: Review of Laurie Shrage, You've Changed: Sex, Gender, and Science. Hird - - Palgrave-Macmillan. Race, Gender, and Sexuality: Philosophical Issues of Identity and Justice. Is Sex Worth Dying For? Geoffrey Rees - - Journal of Religious Ethics 39 2: Intersexuality and the Categories of Sex. Georgia Warnke - - Hypatia 16 3: Mutilation, Deception, and Sex Changes. Lavin - - Journal of Medical Ethics 13 2: A Sociology of Sex and Sexuality.
And Bettcher proposes that there is a kind of existential identity over which we have authority in this sense. This existential identity concerns not the metaphysical matter of what one is, but the existential matter of "who one is" -- what one cares about, stands for, and is moved by p.
You've Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity
It is in this sense that a person may truthfully claim a particular gender identity before having undertaken any of the physical steps of transitioning p. To fail to respect such existential self-identity -- by trying, say, to ferret out whether person's genital status conflicts with his or her gender identifications -- is unethical in the same sense of denying an agent's autonomy.
The natural question is why, in the relevant cases, we ought to consider existential rather than metaphysical identity. Bettcher gives several reasons for taking existential identity to be central in an explanation of First-Person Authority over sex and gender, including that "existential rather than metaphysical self-identity illuminates the centrality of reasons in conferring intelligibility on a person's act of self-identifying" p. But whether one finds this convincing may rest on whether one already accepts the idea that First-Person Authority in this domain is appropriate.
It is not clear how this will convince the person who starts from the point of view that metaphysical identity is what matters. It is also somewhat obscure how commitments to what one cares about or stands for can be gendered. What value commitments ought one to have to say that "I am a woman" is an answer to the existential question of self-identity? A second topic concerns whether feminism and trans activism and theorizing are at odds.
Tension between the two forms a background to this book, and explains why one of its stated aims is "bridge building" p. The tension has several sources. Feminists hoping to preserve women-only space -- as in single-sex schools and institutions -- may see the possibility of women who used to be men as threatening to undermine the relevant criteria and motivations.
And if understanding oppression is particularly important to feminists' projects, the idea of transitioning from woman to man raises the uncomfortable possibility that one is escaping from womanhood by simply giving up on it. People don't generally seem to change race, and if they did this would not be a politically neutral choice.
If the analogy is apt, transitioning could be a kind of selling out. Is changing sex and gender like changing race?
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From the point of view of most authors here, the answer is "No. In articulating a positive view bringing the feminist and trans activist projects together, Hale's essay, already mentioned, gives a conceptualization of selfhood aimed at showing their consistency. The idea, he says, is to place our moral and political values closer to the center of our selfhood than our gendered identity p. This is a promising direction, but it points to the need for more theorizing about what those moral and political values will be. Both respect for personal autonomy and solidarity are relevant here; since these can conflict, we need to know how to incorporate both into an overall outlook.
Feminists and trans activists won't inevitably share the same political goals; in a world of scarce resources, there may be disagreements over whether these are best used addressing women's health issues or helping those who want access to hormone treatments and so on. In her "Sex and Miscibility", Laurie Shrage offers a different and more radical proposal for addressing these difficulties:
Related Youve Changed: Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity (Studies in Feminist Philosophy)
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